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PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF THE INDONESIAN 
FOREIGN EXCHANGE SYSTEM*
Lawrence J. White
In the late 1960’s the foreign sector of the Indonesian economy 
moved out of the thicket of direct quantitative controls and toward 
a system that relied on indirect pricing and market incentives.
Today (December 1971), Indonesia is the largest (by population)* 1 less 
developed country with an open, relatively uncontrolled foreign sector 
and a realistic exchange rate. A recent (August 22, 1971) ten per 
cent devaluation of the rupiah indicates that the Government of 
Indonesia is still committed to maintaining this open system and 
avoiding the dangers of widespread quantitative controls. Since Indo­
nesia is almost unique in its commitment to an open system, and yet 
descriptions of the present day Indonesian economy are scarce, a discus­
sion of this phenomenon may be worthwile.
This paper will try to describe and analyze the present Indonesian 
foreign exchange system. Section I will offer a brief description 
of the Indonesian economy as background. Section II will describe 
the foreign exchange system as it stands today. Section III will 
analyze the system and some of the problems that it faces. And 
Section IV will offer a foreign exchange strategy for the future.
The Economy
General
Indonesia ranks near the bottom of the less developed country 
income tables. In terms of GDP per capita, Indonesia is probably in 
the same range as India and Pakistan. The recent 1970 estimates put 
Indonesia's GDP at Rp 3,328 billion.2 With an estimated population 
of 115 million,3 this works out to Rp 28,800 per capita. At the 1970
* A longer version of this paper was originally presented at the NBER 
conference on Exchange Control, Liberalization, and Economic Develop­
ment, February 26, 1972. Research support was provided by the United 
States Agency for International Development. I would like to thank 
David Cole, Jagdish Bhagwati, and Anne 0. Krueger for their helpful 
comments on earlier drafts.
1. The two larger less developed countries --Mainland China and India-- 
both have controlled foreign sectors.
2. "Survery of Recent Developments," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic 
Studies (BIES), VII, No. 2 (July 1971, p. 3^  This figure is GDP 
at factor cost.
3. Ibid., p . 17.
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exchange rate of Rp 378 equals US $1, this is $76 per capita. It is 
unlikely that this figure, or the underlying average welfare of which 
it is supposed to be an index, is appreciably different from what it 
was in 1930. The years 1930-1950 encompassed the Great Depression (a 
poor period for raw materials prices, with especially severe effects 
on the sugar economies of East Java and Bali), the Second World War 
and heavy taxation by the Japanese occupation forces, and a four-year 
struggle for independence. These were not propitious times for 
economic growth. During the early 1950's, the economy prospered and 
made up some of the damage of the previous twenty years. But the sub­
sequent departure of the Dutch, the spread of direct government con­
trols to many sectors of the economy, and the increasing pace of 
inflation led to economic stagnation. The recent estimates of real 
GDP at constant market prices show a growth rate of 2.1 per cent 
between 1960 and 1966, a rate that was just keeping up with popula­
tion growth. “*
As is true for most less developed countries, Indonesia's economy 
is primarily agricultural. Table 1 gives the average percentage GDP 
sectoral breakdown for the 1960-68 period and the employment per­
centages ascertained in the 1961 census. The central island of Java 
is mostly a rice growing area with small, intensively cultivated plots. 
It is also heavily populated; the island has 65 per cent of the 
country's population on only 7 per cent of the land area. The other 
islands are more sparsely populated, and their inhabitants tend to 
grow mostly cash crops for export (rubber, copra, coffee, pepper, 
spices), though rice is also grown in some areas. Indonesia has been 
a rice importing country, and self-sufficiency in rice has been an 
important economic and political goal.
Table 1
GDP (Average 1960-68) and Employment (1961) , 
by Sector (Percentages)
GDP Employment
Agriculture 52.4 71.9
Mining 3.7 0.3
Manufacturing 8.5 5.7
Construction 1.8 1.8
Electricity 0.4 0.1
Transport 3.5 2.1
Trade 15.5) 7Finance 0.9 ) O • /
Dwellings 2.0
Public Administration 4.9) Q QServices 6.2)
Other 1.9
TOTAL 100.0 100.0
Source: Arndt and Ross, "The New National"; Alex Hunter, 
"Notes on Indonesian Population," in Bruce Glassburner, ed., 
The Economy of Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1971) . 4
4. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, VI, No. 2 (July 1970), 
pp. 142-147.
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A striking figure in Table 1 is the percentage of GDP originating 
in industry. Indonesia is relatively under-industrialized, even com­
pared to its South and Southeast Asian neighbors. During the 1960’s, 
Indonesia generated only 8.5 per cent of its GDP in the manufacturing 
sector (excluding mining). By contrast, the percentage of GDP origi­
nating in manufacturing during the same period in India was 15.6 per 
cent; in Pakistan, 11.0 per cent; in Malaysia, 9.4 per cent; in 
Thailand, 12.6 per cent; and in the Philippines, 18.5 per cent.5 Even 
in 1970, with much of Indonesia’s industrial plant ’’rehabilitated” 
from the neglect and spare parts shortages of the Sukarno years, 
industrial output (value added) was only 10 per cent of GDP.
With industrial wages that are among the lowest in the world-- 
industrial labor costs in 1971 are typically Rp 200-250 (US $0.55- 
$0.66) per worker per day--one would expect to find Indonesia with a 
comparative advantage in labor intensive manufacturing, like textiles 
and assembly operations. But this potential comparative advantage 
has not yet materialized, for a number of reasons: weak infrastruc­
tures support (electricity, roads, rail, seat transport, message 
communications are all in poor shape); a general shortage of capital 
and entrepreneurial skills; a hostility to foreign capital investment 
and entrepreneurship during the Sukarno years; and fiscal, monetary 
and foreign exchange policies during the Sukarno years that tended 
to discourage private capital formation and that did not generate 
enough efficient government capital formation. Within the manufac­
turing sector, about two-thirds of value-added in 1970 was generated 
in the comparatively simple activities of food, beverages, tobacco, 
and textiles, with hand weaving and hand batik-dying accounting for 
an appreciable part of this last area.6 Indonesia has not yet entered 
the lists of less developed countries trying to export manufactured 
products. In 1970, less than one-half per cent of Indonesian exports 
qualified as ’’manufactured.”
The Stabilization Program7
A new political regime, led by General (later, President) Suharto, 
took power in early 1966, following the abortive coup of September 30,
5. H. W. Arndt and C. Ross, ’’The New National Income Estimates,” Bulletin 
of Indonesian Economic Studies, VI, No. 3 (November 1970),
Table 2, p. 49.
6. Wilhelm Boucherie, ’’Some Preliminary Estimates Concerning the Present 
Structure of Industry” (Djakarta: Harvard Development Advisory 
Service, 1971), mimeograph.
7. For a further discussion of the inflation and the stabilization 
program, see H. W. Arndt, ’’Banking in Hyperinflation and Stabiliza­
tion,” in Bruce Glassburner, ed., The Economy of Indonesia (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1971); Bruce G1assburner, ’’Indonesian 
Economic Policy After Sukarno,” in Glassburner, The Economy; and 
Gunnar Tomasson, ’’Indonesia: Economic Stabilization, 1966-69,”
Finance and Development, VII, No. 4 (December 1970).
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1965. The economy that the new regime inherited was in a shambles. 
Indonesia was in the throes of a hyper-inflation. The rate of 
inflation in 1965 was over 600 per cent per year.8 The banking sys­
tem had disintegrated. The legal exchange rate was only 6 per cent 
of the black market rate. Appreciable amounts of exports were being 
smuggled out of the country, and capital, too, was likely being 
smuggled out. The Sukarno regime had run up huge foreign debts, most­
ly for military hardware and public monuments. Indonesia owed $2.4 
billion to foreign creditors, with little to show for it of a produc­
tive nature. The scheduled servicing of this debt called for $530 
million in 1966. Recorded exports in 1965 were only $634 million.
Stopping inflation was a primary goal of the new regime. Measured 
on a January-to-January basis, inflation in 1966 was "down” to a rate 
of 420 per cent. In 1967, the rate was down to 170 per cent. In 
1968, the rate fell further to 35 per cent. In 1969, prices rose 
15 per cent, and in 1970 prices rose by only 4 per cent.
The proximate reasons for this halting of inflation are not hard 
to find: an end to government deficit spending, a more moderate ex­
pansion in the money supply, and a substantial inflow of resources from 
abroad. These phenomena are, of course, all related. In 1966 govern­
ment expenditures were Rp 29.4 billion, while tax and other receipts 
were only Rp 13 billion, or only 44 per cent of expenditures. The 
difference of Rp 16.4 billion (this was 2 per cent of GDP) accounted 
for over 80 per cent of the expansion of the money supply in 1966.
But this 44 per cent receipts/expenditure ratio was an improvement 
from the preceding year, when the ratio had been 36 per cent. In 
1967, the receipts picture improved considerably. Non-foreign-aid 
related receipts were Rp 60.2 billion, or 85 per cent of routine 
budget expenditures. The counterpart funds from sales of foreign aid 
provided another Rp 24.7 billion, so that Rp 17.5 billion in develop­
ment spending could take place. The overall deficit was only Rp 2.5 
billion, or less than 3 per cent of expenditures. By 1968 non-aid 
receipts were even with routine expenditures, and the overall budget 
was balanced. This was the first balanced budget Indonesia had 
achieved since 1951. As Table 2 indicates, by the 1969/70 fiscal 
year9 a substantial surplus on "current account" had been obtained, 
and the government had become an important source of savings in the 
economy.
The ending of the government deficits was the product of both an 
increase in tax receipts and a decrease in real government spending, 
the latter occurring mostly on the capital budget. Many of the 
large public works and show piece projects of the Sukarno regime were 
stopped. As Table 2 indicates, "development" spending fell signifi­
cantly in 1966 as a fraction of the government budget. Table 3 shows 
these effects yet more clearly. When corrected for inflation, 
routine government spending did not change appreciably, but real 
development spending fell in 1966. Also, it is likely that some of 
the Sukarno projects that were stopped were never accounted for in 
the official budget in the first place, so actual spending probably 
fell by more than the figures of Tables 2 and 3 indicate. At the 
same time, real tax receipts increased substantially. To some extent,
8. A maximum rate of 1500 per cent per year was reached between June 
1965 and June 1966.
9. In 1969, the government switched the fiscal year from one that was 
identical with the calendar year to one that begins on April 1.
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taxes were increased, especially in cases in which taxes and levies 
had been stated in absolute rupiahs, the value of which had been 
drastically reduced by the inflation. But also effective tax col­
lection had disintegrated toward the end of the Sukarno years, and 
the new government, by bringing a greater measure of political 
stability, was simply able to collect existing taxes more effectively.
Table 2
Actual Government Revenues and Expenditures, 
1965-1970/71 (billions of Rupiahs)
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969/70 1970/71
Revenues
Taxes and other 
domestic receipts 0.9 13.1 60.2 149.7 234.7 344.6
Counterpart funds -- -- 24.7 35.5 91.1 120.5
TOTAL 0.9 13.1 84.9 185.3 334.8 465.1
Expenditures
Routine 2.1 25.7 70.0 149.7 216.5 288.2
Development 0.4 3.7 17.5 35.5 118.1 169.8
TOTAL 2.5 29.4 87.6 185.3 334.7 457.9
Deficit or Surplus -1.6 -16.3 -2.7 + 7.2
Source: Bank Indonesia, Indonesian Financial Statistics, October 
1971, pp. 68-71. ‘
The preceding paragraphs overstate the case to some extent, since 
the budget figures exclude some government agencies which ran at a 
loss and were directly subsidized by the central bank. Chief among 
these was the government rice procurement and price stabilization 
agency, BULOG. Further, the budget accounted for rice expenditures 
(for salary in kind) at a price paid by the treasury to BULOG that 
was below BULOGTs costs, transferring deficits from the budget account 
to BULOG!s account. Still, I believe that the trends shown in the 
tables are indicative of the true trends.
The inflation might have been brought under control even sooner 
than it was. The rate of price increase in the middle of 1967 had 
definitely begun to slacken. But a poor dry season rice harvest at 
the end of 1967 sent the price of rice climbing again. The rice 
price in Djakarta, which had been roughly stable between January and 
August 1967, doubled between August and December 1967 and doubled
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again in the next month. Since rice has a 31 per cent weight in the 
price index, these rises were heavily reflected in the price index. 
Further, "sympathy" movements in other prices followed with a short 
lag. Since most prices and wages tend to be keyed to the price of 
rice, these "sympathy" rises were to be expected.
Table 3
Price Corrected Government Revenues and Expenditures, 
1965-1970/71 (in September 1966 Rupiahs)
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969/70 1970/71
Price Index
(September 1966=1 .00) 0.07 0.76 2.06 4.63 5.63 6.26
Revenues
Taxes and other 
domestic receipts 12.6 17.2 29.2 32.3 43.3 55.0
Counterpart funds -- 12.0 7.7 16.2 19.2
TOTAL 12.6 17.2 41.3 40.0 59.5 74.3
Expenditures
Routine 30.0 33.8 34.0 32.3 538.5 46.0
Development 5.7 4.9 8.5 7.7 21.0 27.1
TOTAL 35.7 38.8 42.5 40.0 59.0 73.1
Source: Bank Indonesia, Indonesian Financial Statistics, October 1971,
pp. 68-71.
Large rice imports in early 1968, mostly from PL 480, stabilized 
the rice price and lowered it somewhat, but the catching up of other 
prices continued to push the overall index up. Only by the first 
quarter of 1969 did other prices reach the same rough parity with 
rice that had existed in late 1966 and early 1967. In the absence of 
major structural changes, which are unlikely to have occurred over 
this period, we would expect this rough parity to re-assert itself. 
Thus, only by the first quarter of 1969 had the full effects of the 
poor harvest of the 1967 dry season been worked out. With better 
luck, the inflation might have ended a year earlier.
The inflow of external resources was also important to the halt­
ing of inflation. In 1966, the net inflow on government account (aid 
less debt repayment) was $96 million and private capital inflow was 
$50 million. In 1967, these figures jumped to $219 million and $100 
million, respectively. As seen in Table 4, net official inflows con­
tinued to expand while prive inflows fell and then recovered in 
1970. (The recent private capital inflow figures probably under­
estimate considerably the amounts of capital flowing in to finance 
activities like oil exploration.) These inflows made more goods
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available to the economy, and to some extent they also transferred 
rupiahs from the private sector to the government. Between 75 per 
cent and 90 per cent of the annual gross aid inflows were in the 
form of program aid, much of which the government sold off to the 
private sector. The government then used these counterpart funds 
as it did other fiscal receipts. This should not be confused with 
inflationary finance. By selling the aid, the government gained 
the claims over domestic resources that the buyers of the aid goods 
had formerly possessed. The counterpart rupiahs were thus a non- 
inflationary claim on domestic resources in the same way that tax 
rupiahs were a non-inflationary claim.
Table 4
Capital Flows, 1966-1970 (millions of dollars)
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
Program Aid a 195 246 249 284
Project Aid a 69 20 69 110
Other Aid (net) a 9 32 7 -28
TOTAL 96 273 298 325 366
Debt Repayment a -54 -75 -40 -66
Private Capital (net) 50 100 33 55 109
Net Capital Flow 146 319 256 340 409
a. The $96 million in 1966 represents gross aid less debt 
repayment.
Source: Bank Indonesia, Indonesian Financial Statistics,
October 1971, pp. 128-129, 140.
Hand in hand with efforts to increase the inflow of external re­
sources were efforts to re-schedule the debt obligations of the Sukarno 
regime. The original obligations, requiring an immediate payment of 
$530 million in 1966, $270 million and $275 million in 1967 and 1968, 
and further annual payments into the 1980fs, would have had a crushing 
effect on the economy. A moratorium on Sukarno debt repayments was 
declared, and negotiations with the creditor countries followed. (Re­
payments were maintained however, on short-term obligations incurred 
after 1965.) Finally, in 1970, agreement on rescheduling was achieved 
with Indonesia’s Western creditors, and the following year a similar 
agreement with its Socialist creditors was reached. Since debt repay­
ments would have had the opposite effect of aid inflows on the economy,10 
the moratorium and rescheduling greatly facilitated the government’s 
efforts to close its receipts expenditures gap.
10. To the extent that aid was tied and worth less than free foreign 
exchange, debt repayments would have been yet more costly for 
the economy and not just symmetrical with aid.
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Finally, with government deficits eliminated, the major source 
of money supply expansion had been eliminated. These actions were 
supported by a general high interest rate policy. In October 1966, 
interest rates were hiked to 6-9 per cent per month from their 
previous nominal rate of 9 per cent per annum. The government an­
nounced as a goal that 90 per cent of all new credits should be for 
the financing of new production and exports. Importers were required 
to prepay 100 per cent of the value of their imports plus 50 per cent 
of the duties and were limited in their ability to borrow for this 
purpose.
By April 1967 these measures had had a large disinflationary 
effect, and the business community had begun to object. In that 
month, interest rates were lowered to 4-7 per cent per month, the 
import prepayment was reduced to 25 per cent of import value, and the 
prepayment of the import duties was abolished. (Subsequently, the 
100 per cent import prepayment was restored, and duty prepayments 
were re-imposed sporadically.) Since that time, interest rates on 
loans have drifted downward until, in mid-1971 they stood at a 1-4 
per cent range per month.
Further, interest rates were made attractive on the saving 
side. In October 1968 the government instituted a program of time 
deposits paying 1-1/2 per cent per month on one month deposits up to 
6 per cent per month on one year deposits, tax free, no questions 
asked. With the inflation largely over by this time, the latter 
rate soon became too high and was lowered to 5 per cent in March 1969 
and lowered again a number of times in 1969. In mid-1971, the time 
deposit rates were 1 per cent per month on one month deposits, 1-1/2 
per cent per month on three month deposits, 1-3/4 per cent per month 
on six month deposits, and 2 per cent per month on one year deposits.
The response to these interest rates was strong. In December 
1968, three months after the beginning of the program, Rp 4.4 billion 
in deposits were in the program. Six months later, the figure was 
Rp 24.5 billion. In December 1969, they had grown Rp 33.6. By mid- 
1971 this figure had grown to Rp 73.7 billion.
Despite the high interest rate programs described above, the 
money supply continued to expand but at a slackened pace from the pre- 
1966 period. And, as price increases slackened for all of the reasons 
discussed above, transactions velocity declined and the public's 
willingness to hold cash balances increased. Between December 1965 
and March 1971, the real money holdings of the economy increased by 
over four-fold.
Why Did Stabilization Succeed?
The stabilization program that has been described was essentially 
quite an orthodox one. That it worked is really no surprise. That 
it was allowed to work is another question. What was it about the 
social-economic-political structure of Indonesia that allowed this 
stablization program to work? This question has special interest, 
since many similar stabilization packages have repeatedly failed to 
halt much more moderate inflations in Latin America.
The sheer pace of the inflation probably made it easier to bring 
about a stabilization program. Though, undoubtedly, some groups
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gained relatively and some groups lost through the inflation, price 
increases of 600 per cent a year must have created great uncertainities 
for all. The price level doubled between March and September 1965; it 
sextupled between September and the following March. With this kind 
of pace and acceleration, even the gainers might have concluded that 
they would be better off with less inflation and less uncertainty. 
Further, by late 1965, the inflation had fed on itself and velocity 
had increased substantially. For example, between December 1964 and 
December 1965, the money supply increased four-fold but prices in­
creased six-fold. The political uncertainties of the last three months 
of 1965 surely accelerated the velocity. But, with the assumption to 
power in 1966 of a new government that at least seemed to promise 
political stability, velocity was likely to decrease, and some slacken­
ing of the inflation rate was likely to occur.
But these arguments only explain why a stabilization program might 
be allowed to begin and gain initial successes; they do not explain 
why the gainers from inflation would allow a stabilization program to 
continue after the inflation had slackened but not ceased. And, indeed, 
the April 1967 lowering of interest rates was in response to the com­
plaints of a business community that was being hurt by the deflationary 
effects of the stabilization. But even after April, interest rates 
of 4-7 per cent represented hefty borrowing charges and, except for the 
few months at the time of the bad rice harvest, represented positive 
real rates of interest. The stabilization program was not junked 
in April 1967, and we must find further reasons why it was allowed to 
succeed.
First, the new government that took power in 1966 was certainly 
less anti-Western in its political outlook than the Sukarno regime 
had been. The stabilization program coincided with the views of the 
Western aid donors as to how a basis for economic growth in the Indo­
nesian economy should be established. Had this aid not been forth­
coming, it is most unlikely that the stabilization program could have 
been carried out as successfully and as quickly as it was.
A second reason for the success of the stabilization program is 
that Indonesia is not very urbanized. The 1961 census indicated that 
15 per cent of the population lived in urban areas.11 Though this 
percentage had surely growth by the mid and late 1960’s, it was still 
considerably below the 40-70 per cent range usually found in Latin 
America. Thus, the urban constituency that might have benefited from 
inflation, through employment on deficit-financed urban monuments and 
public works and through the purchase of subsidized commodities, was 
simply not very big.
Third, Indonesia is not very industrialized. The manufacturing 
sectors are frequently hit hard in Latin American deflations, and the 
workers in the manufacturing sectors are frequently vocal in their 
opposition to the effects of deflation. But, as noted above, the 
manufacturing sector is small in Indonesia. Manufacturing employment 
was only 5.7 per cent of total employment in 1961, and that percentage 
probably did not grow during the 1960!s. Further, much of this manu­
facturing was in comparatively simple, basic items, the demand for 
which was likely to be income inelastic. Also, manufacturing had not 
benefited appreciably during the inflation. The available GNP figures
11. Alex Hunter, ’’Notes on Indonesian Population,” in Glassburner, 
The Economy.
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indicate that real income originating in the manufacturing sector 
between 1961 and 1965 did not expand. And for some large-scale opera­
tions, like textiles and automobile assembly plants, output surely 
declined as the economy became more chaotic and raw materials and 
spare parts became more difficult to obtain.
Fourth, the urban and industrial population has not been strongly 
organized. Labor unions and associations of white collar and govern­
ment employees were never economically strong because of general sur­
plus labor conditions, but they were politically powerful before 1965. 
They were estimated to have within their ranks 20-25 per cent of the 
wage and salary workers in industry and government service.12 But 
since 1965, their political power has been broken. There has simply 
been no one to lead the urban groups that may have been the losers 
from stabilization. In one late instance with which this author is 
personally familiar, the government in January 1970 ended the sub­
sidy on kerosene and doubled its price. This is the sole cooking 
fuel for most Indonesians and an important item in their consumption; 
as a consequence of the price increase, the cost of living index 
jumped by 3.3 per cent. Yet the comparatively moderate and ineffec­
tual street demonstrations that followed the price announcement were 
led by students. There was no other leadership group around to lead 
them.
As a summary and extension to these arguments, one might say 
that the September 30 coup failure and its aftermath changed the 
nature of Indonesian politics. A new, explicitly military govern­
ment came to power. Those who had benefited from the Sukarno politics 
were no longer in power, and their organizations were disbanded or 
rendered ineffectual. The political channels that had been built up 
during the previous fifteen years were in ruins, and in this vacuum 
the new government was able to carry out its stabilization program 
along orthodox or classical "liberal" lines in order to provide the 
foundation for a development program along liberal lines. The politi­
cal and financial encouragement of the United States, Western Europe, 
and the IMF, and the World Bank greatly facilitated this program.
As a final note to this section, it is worth mentioning that 
recent GDP estimates for 1970 indicate that real GDP at market prices 
grew by about 23 per cent between 1966 and 1970.13 This is not an 
unimpressive rate for an economy that was simultaneously going through 
a deflationary stabilization program.
The Present Foreign Exchange System
General
Indonesia currently operates what is basically an open foreign 
exchange system. This is a relatively recent phenomenon. The foreign
12. E. D. Hawkins, "Labor in Developing Countries: Indonesia," in 
Glassburner, The Economy.
13. See Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, VI, No. 2 (July 1970), 
pp. 142-147, and Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, VII,
No. 2 (July 1971)7 p. 3.
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exchange history of the Sukarno regime was largely one of over­
valuation (despite multiple exchange rates), required surrender of 
export proceeds, and quantitative import and capital controls, with 
short periods of liberalization always followed by a re-application 
of controls when an import surge and/or capital flight threatened the 
balance of payments.llf
In early 1966, with the inflation at its height, the government 
decided to let the system of multiple exchange rates float mainly in 
response to market forces, so that exporter returns would keep pace 
with the rising prices and export smuggling would be discouraged.
Over the next three years, the exchange rates floated upwards, 
quantitative controls over imports and capital flows were progressively 
unwound, export taxes were reduced, and the multiple exchange rates 
were consolidated.14 5 These actions were consistent with the general 
"de-control” that the Indonesian economy was experiencing and with the 
governments desire to encourage exports and discourage export smuggling. 
By April 1970 the exchange rate was consolidated to one basic rate, 
and this rate was stabilized at Rp 378 = $1.16 Finally, in August 1971, 
as pressure developed on Indonesia’s balance of payment and in the 
wake of the U.S. float, Indonesia devalued by 10 per cent.
The nominal exchange rate currently is Rp 415 * US $1, and all 
transactions take place at that rate. The exchange rate is not 
officially pegged, but since late 1968 the policy of the Bank Indonesia 
has been to stabilize the exchange rate at a particular level (which 
has changed twice) through purchases and sales in the foreign exchange 
market.
Since there is no exchange control, Indonesians and foreigners 
alike are free to buy, sell, and hold foreign exchange. Though ex­
porters are required to turn in their foreign exchange proceeds to the 
Central Bank upon receipt, this is mainly for tax recording purposes.
The exporters are free to buy back the foreign exchange, paying the 
small difference between the Bank’s buying and selling rates. In 
essence, the provision adds a minor tax (roughly 1/2 per cent) to 
export transactions. Foreign investment is welcomed, though all foreign 
investment schemes must be approved by a government agency, the Foreign 
Investment Board.
14. W. M. Cordon and J. A. C. Mackie, "The Development of the Indonesian 
Exchange Rate System,” Malaysian Economic Review, VII, No. 1 (April 
1962); S. Kanesa-Thasan, "Multiple Exchange Rates: The Indonesian 
Experience,” International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, XIII, No. 2 
(July 1966).
15. More details can be gained from the "Survey of Recent Developments,” 
contained in every issue of the Bulletin of Indonesian Economic 
Studies. See also Bruce Glassburner, "Pricing of Foreign Exchange 
in Indonesia, 1966-67,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 
XVIII, No. 2 (January 1970), and William C. Hollinger, "The Foreign 
Exchange Rate as a Policy Instrument: The Indonesian Case, 1966- 
70,” paper presented to the Dubrovnik Conference of the Harvard 
Development Advisory Service (June 197), mimeograph.
16. The dual exchange rates preceding April 1970 had been stabilized 
earlier. The lower (BE) rate had been stabilized at Rp 326 = $1 
in October 1968 and the higher (DP) rate had been stabilized at 
Rp 378 = $1 in March 1969.
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Exports
Most exports are subject to a 10 per cent export tax, bringing 
the effective exchange rate for exports down to Rp 374. Manufactured 
exports and handicrafts are exempt from the 10 per cent tax, but these 
items accounted for less than 1 per cent of Indonesian exports in 
1970. (Semi-processing of raw materials like rubber or copra does 
not count as manufacturing.) Also, petroleum and petroleum products 
are exempt from the tax; these exports are the special concern of 
the state-owned oil company, and special transfers from the company 
are allocated to the central treasury. In the 1970-71 budget year, 
export taxes brought in Rp 30.4 billion, or 9 per cent of the central 
governments tax receipts.
Many raw materials which leave a province (there are twenty-six 
provinces) have to pay an absolute levy, the cess, whether the raw 
materials are destined for export or for other provinces, and copra, 
coffee, and pepper are also subject to rehabilitation fund levies.1*
In the past, the sum of these levies has gotten as high as 15 per 
cent (on copra), though it was only 1 per cent on rubber. Since 
most rubber is exported, the rubber cess was effectively an additional 
export tax. For most other materials, like copra, coffee, and spices, 
there are substantial domestic demands, and the materials tend to 
move from one province to another, so there is no direct discrimina­
tion against exports. As part of the August 1971 devaluation package, 
the rubber cess was removed, the copra and coffee cesses were halved, 
and the rehabilitation fund levies were substantially reduced. The 
effective tax from the cess and rehabilitation funds is now 0 per 
cent on rubber, 6 per cent on copra, 5 per cent on coffee, and 1.5-2.0 
per cent on pepper.
Table 5 shows the approximate levels of the different Indonesian 
exports for calender year 1970. About 60 per cent of the total is 
accounted for by the two categories: petroleum and rubber. The addi­
tion of three more categories--lumber, coffee, and tin--brings the 
percentage to over 80 per cent. This is a high level of concentra­
tion, by any definition. The remaining 20 per cent is composed of a 
scattering of other raw materials. The only manufactured export 
large enough to rate a separate listing in government export statis­
tics is $2.3 million worth of handicrafts.
Imports
Most imports are subject only to the restraints of import duties. 
The Indonesian import duty schedule is the usual cascaded hodgepodge 
found in most developing and developed countries. Capital goods bear 
duties of 0-30 per cent, raw materials pay between 0 and 70 per cent, 17
17. The cess and rehabilitation fund levies are supposed to be spent 
on infrastructure relating to the taxed exports (e.g., roads, 
warehouses, shipping facilities, research). There has been a 
great deal of dissatisfaction on the part of producers and ex­
porters, who have not perceived many new facilities being gener­
ated by< these taxes. This may have been one of the contributing 
factors in the decision to reduce them in August 1971.
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Table 5
Exports,a 1970 (millions of dollars)
Petroleum $ 434 
Rubber 270 
Lumber 125 
Coffee 71 
Tin 62 
Palm Oil 38 
Copra 30 
Tea 19 
Tobacco 12 
Tapioca 9 
Copra Cakes 7 
Hides 6 
Palm Kernels 5 
Pepper 3 
Other 82
TOTAL $1,173
a. Because the check price values were 
appreciably below the true export 
values for the first three months of 
1970, the actual export values must 
necessarily be guesses.
Sources: Bank Indonesia, Indonesia Finan­
cial Statistics, October 1971, 
pp. 130-133.
semi-finished products bear duties of 30-120 per cent, and consumer 
goods pay between 30 per cent and 300 per cent. A few basic food­
stuffs, like rice and wheat flour, have a zero duty. On an unweighted 
basis, import duties average 55 per cent. Weighted by total imports 
for calendar year 1970, import duties averaged 14 per cent; if the 
major duty-free items of rice, wheat flour, fertilizer and oil company- 
related imports are excluded from the total, import duties averaged 
18 per cent. Government agencies are expected to pay duties on their 
imports, just like other importers. In addition to import duties, 
sales taxes are levied on imports, at rates of 0, 5, 10, 20, or 50 per 
cent. A separate sales tax schedule applies to domestically produced 
goods. Though the rates on domestic and imported items are frequently 
consistent, there are differences and even cases in which the domestic 
product is taxed more heavily than the import. In the 1970/71 budget, 
import duties brought in Rp 70.7 billion and the import sales tax 
brought in another Rp 22.1. Together, they accounted for 27 per cent 
of tax receipts. If export taxes are added, all taxes on trade 
accounted for 36 per cent of budgetary tax receipts.
Table 6 provides a rough breakdown of imports in 1970 as provided 
by Bank Indonesia.18 Two items from the table are worth noting. First,
18. Total imports are listed in the balance of payments as $1,138 million 
on the FOB basis. An 11 per cent factor is usually applied to bring 
imports up to a CIF basis. This yields $1,263 million. Bank Indo­
nesia gives a break-down of $1,132.7 million on a CIF basis, ex­
cluding imports for the oil companies. These last were $92 million 
on an FOB basis of $102 million CIF. This leaves $28 million which 
was unclassified.
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rice and wheat flour imports totaled $170.3 million, or 13 per cent 
of the total import bill. However, most of these foodstuffs were 
provided through foreign aid on free or very easy (e.g., PL480) terms. 
Second, colored and uncolored textile imports came to $36.9 million; 
also, a sizable fraction of the unclassified imports were probably 
textiles. This sizable level of textile imports into a country with 
industrial wages that are among the lowest in the world is a good 
indicator of the low level of industrialization of the country.
Table 6
Imports, 1970 (millions of dollars, C.I.F.)
Rice $111.2
Wheat flour 59.1
Textiles 32.7
Cambrics and sheeting 4.5
Motor cars 14.9
Other consumer goods 145.4
Total consumer goods
Cloves 20.7
Chemicals 53.6
Chemical products and preparations 11.5
Paint materials 16.4
Fertilizer 22.5
Paper 23.5
Weaving yarns 35.6
Cement 14.6
Iron and steel products 40.9
Other raw materials 146.5
Total raw materials
$ 367.8
385.4
Iron and steel pipes 9.9 
Machinery and engines 39.5 
Buses and trucks 52.0 
Other capital goods 278.1
Total capital goods 379.5
Imports for Oil Companies 102.0
Unclassified (estimated) 28.0
Total Imports $1,262.7
Source: Bank Indonesia, Indonesia Financial Statistics,
October 1971, pp. 128-129, 136-137.
A complete study of the allocative effects of Indonesia's import 
duty structure has not yet been made, but the structure appears to 
yield positive and substantial effective protection for many import 
substitution activities (i.e., the net effect of duties on outputs 
and on inputs is to yield a positive and large increase in the value 
added of these activities). The structure of imports and the low 
level of industrialization indicate that entrepreneurs are only just 
beginning to take advantage of this protection.
139
The Exceptions
There are some exceptions to the picture of an open economy des­
cribed above. A handful of exports are prohibited: low quality
rubber from some parts of Indonesia (Kalimantan); gold and silver and 
their ores; iron, brass, and copper scrap; and cultural antiquities. 
Only the rubber provision is economically important. It is designed 
to improve Indonesia’s image as a high quality exporter and is also 
designed to encourage domestic remilling and crumb rubber operations 
in particular areas. Rubber remillers and crumb rubber factory 
owners in other areas (e.g., Sumatra) have been urging the government 
to extend the ban to their areas.
Second, copra exports from Sulawesi and the Malukus (these areas 
account for 90 per cent of Indonesia’s copra exports) are under the 
direction of the Ministry of Trade, through its Copra Management Board. 
Copra exports in this area have had a history of informal local taxes. 
The consequences were a reduction in financial yields to small-holder 
copra farmers, neglect of copra growing areas and the absence of re­
planting, and a decline in copra exports. In efforts to change this 
situation, the Copra Management Board was set up in August 1969. It 
licenses who can engage in copra export and inter-island trade, how 
much they may ship, where they must buy, and where they must sell.
At the same time, the Board has made strenuous and largely successful 
efforts to eliminate the informal local taxes and is trying to ensure 
that formal local taxes (e.g., the cess and a special Board levy) do 
get spent on infrastructure related to copra. Returns to copra farmers 
do seem to have improved, and the buying and selling restrictions have 
not proved very onerous so far. Nevertheless, there does seem to be 
room for a less restrictive system that would still yield benefits 
for copra farmers.
There are more exceptions on the import side, and they are more 
important. First, there are five commodities tne import of which has 
been reserved exclusively to government agencies. These are rice, 
wheat flour, cotton fertilizer, and sugar. These five commodities 
accounted for roughly 18-20 per cent of total imports in 1970. Some 
reasons can be offered for the government’s desire to retain exclusive 
import rights to the commodities. Rice and wheat flour imports are 
crucial to the government’s program of rice price supports, price 
stabilization, and long-term self-sufficiency. The government believes 
that it has better information and is better equipped on the logistics 
of the program than are private traders, and the government considers 
its program so crucial that it is not willing to leave these imports 
to the vagaries of the private sector. Also, these imports are largely 
bought through aid money, and by retaining control over these imports 
the government can minimize the hard foreign exchange that is spent on 
them. Though the minimization could also be achieved by differential 
pricing of the aid foreign exchange, donors frown on such practices 
(e.g., the U.S. government’s requirement that PL480 imports be sold 
at the highest prevailing rate of exchange). Cotton is imported ex­
clusively under PL480, and the government has considered it easier, 
for the above reason, to retain exclusive control. The Ministry of 
Trade has exclusive import rights for fertilizer, because of an in­
cident a few years ago in which an unauthorized individual in the 
government ordered from a foreign producer a large amount of fertilizer 
at an unfavorable price. The government felt itself obligated to honor 
the commitment, but to prevent the recurrence of the incident it 
restricted fertilizer imports to the Ministry of Trade. There is no
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good reason for the sugar restriction, but Indonesia is not alone in 
intervening in the sugar market. There seem to be few countries, 
developed and less developed alike, that do not actively intervene in 
the sugar market.
Second, a number of imports are banned entirely. Table 7 lists 
these items. Until August 1970, only the first five items were banned. 
In the last few months of 1970, in response to protectionist pressures 
from local manufacturers, the government put the remaining items on 
the list. Not too surprisingly, all but three of the items are con­
sumer goods. At the moment, the economic effect of the bans is prob­
ably small, and there has been no inclination on the part of the 
government to expand the list since November 1970. Nevertheless, 
the precedent may be an unhappy one.
Table 7
Banned Imports, as of July 1971
Batiks and batik-motif cloth
Printed matter in the Indonesian language
Vehicle tires of certain sizes
Fully assembled commercial vehicles (into Java and Sumatra) 
Used bottles
Dry cell batteries of certain sizes
Striped cotton cloth
Galvanized iron sheets
Ungalvanized iron sheets
Built-up radios and TV’s
Semi-knocked-down radios and TV’s
Canned condensed milk
Lamps and bulbs of certain sizes
Built-up motorcycles
Mosquito incense
Source: Ministry of Trade
Analysis and Problems
This section will draw on the discussion of the previous three 
sections and will analyze the effects that the foreign exchange sys­
tem has had on the Indonesian economy and the problems that it has 
created. A number of themes will be discussed: the question of why
quantitative controls have largely been avoided; the nature of the 
operation of the system; export incentives; pricing foreign aid; and 
foreign investment problems.
The Lack of Quantitative Restrictions
There is no single reason why Indonesia has largely avoided 
quantitative restrictions since 1965. Rather, a number of mutually 
reinforcing arguments have led Indonesian policy-makers to these 
policies.
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First, the aid donors were favorably inclined toward an open 
foreign exchange system. It is certainly debatable as to whether 
the aid flows and commitments would have been forthcoming in the 
same magnitudes if the direct controls of the pre-1965 era had con­
tinued .
Second, most of the new policy makers were ideologically favorable 
toward policies involving less direct controls. Many of the "techno­
crats,1* as the new ministers and their advisers came to be called, had 
been trained in the United States in economics during the 1950*s and 
early 1960*s.19 These were men who were sympathetic toward markets 
and the results that markets yielded. Their orientation was certainly 
not complete laissez faire, but they were much more inclined to avoid 
direct controls and to intervene through the market rather than by­
pass the market.
Third, the widespread breakdown and clear failure of the Sukarno 
regime*s direct controls was a clear and powerful demonstration of 
the potential difficulties of a system of quantitative restrictions.
The import licensing cum overvalued exchange rate had generated wide­
spread export and import smuggling, exacerbated corruption problems 
within the government, contributed to the construction of inefficient 
or inappropriate factories, and created serious raw materials and 
spare parts shortages throughout the economy. Current industrial 
surveys of Indonesia are filled with references to inactive factories, 
which either should never have been constructed in the first place or 
which had been cannibalized for spare parts or simply neglected because 
of non-availability of foreign exchange. By 1965 the economic fabric 
of the society had disintegrated, largely because of the inflation, 
but the direct controls and their consequences had certainly exacerbated 
the situation. The lessons of Sukarnofs direct controls were clear and 
surely made it easier for the new regime to move away from direct con­
trols. This is not to argue that every society needs or ought to go 
through the economic wringer that Indonesia experienced between 1964 and 
1967, but it certainly did make it easier for policy makers to adopt 
different policies.
Fourth, the rapid pace of the inflation itself in 1966 made direct 
controls and an overvalued exchange rate a patently unworkable policy. 
With inflation rates of 10 per cent, 20 per cent, or perhaps even 
50 per cent per year, policy makers might try to maintain direct 
controls with a fair amount of success. But with an inflation rate 
of 400-600 per cent per year, any pegged exchange rate would very 
quickly become unrealistic, and exports would either cease or enter 
smuggling channels. Government policy was sure to be frustrated.
Some form of floating exchange rate was the only realistic policy in 
the face of that inflation.
This argument is reinforced by the pre-1966 experience. With 
direct controls and an accelerating inflation, recorded exports 
declined significantly in 1962-65 from earlier levels. It is likely 
that most of this apparent decline was a diversion of exports into 
smuggling channels. It was common knowledge that substantial amounts 
of exports were being smuggled. The local wholesale prices of export 
commodities were sometimes in excess of their export values converted 
at the legal (unfavorable) exchange rate.20 This phenomenon could
19. See Glassburner, "Indonesian Economic," pp. 432-434.
20. K. D, Thomas, "*Price Disparity* in Export Trade,** Bulletin of 
Indonesian Economic Studies, No. 4 (June 1966).
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have been due to temporary dips in the international price to which 
the local price had not yet adjusted, but it was more likely due to 
the demand of exporters who were smuggling and therefore could afford 
to pay a high domestic price for the commodities. One estimate has 
put Indonesian export smuggling at $140-$200 million or more per year 
between 1958 and 1962.21 The high figure would have represented a 
quarter of all exports, a third of non-oil exports. It is likely that 
these smuggling levels persisted or grew through the middle 1960’s.
Fifth, the government had a revenue interest in a floating ex­
change rate. As noted above, about a third of government revenues 
come from trade taxes. If the exchange rate were pegged at an over­
valued rate and the scarcity premium of foreign exchange were not 
captured through tariffs or license auctions but instead the licenses 
were simply handed out, the government would have lost potential 
revenue. With rapid inflation going on, this revenue loss could 
quickly become substantial. Further, to the extent that licensing 
and over-valuation drove exports and imports into smuggling channels, 
the government would lose revenues. Export and import smuggling 
flows of $200 million per year each way could mean a large amount of 
lost revenue. Government revenues, then, did depend on keeping the 
effective exchange rates to exporters within a reasonable distance 
of the free market rate.
There seems to have been, however, some asymmetry with respect 
to smuggling fears. Though fears of export smuggling were probably 
influential in keeping the exchange rates realistic and improving 
the relative returns to exporters, the likelihood of import smuggling 
did not prevent the government from establishing the import duty 
structure described in Section II, with duties extending up to 300 per 
cent. This duty structure has definitely encouarged import smuggling. 
While export smuggling has virtually ceased because of the narrowing 
of the gap between FOB prices and exporter receipts, import smuggling 
continues to be a problem for Indonesia.
Operation of the System
Some further discussion of the operation of the system is war­
ranted. First, until April 1970 the system operated through dual 
exchange rates. Multiple exchange rates sometimes carry a connota­
tion as a less "clean" or "respectable" protective device than 
tariffs or export taxes. This is certainly the impression that one 
gets from IMF policy efforts. In this light, it is worth stressing 
that the Indonesian dual exchange rates were simply a way of supple­
menting the incentives and disincentives of the trade taxes. The 
Indonesian policy makers found this to be an efficient and reliable 
way of achieving these effects. The dual exchange rates were essen­
tially an extra tax on exports and a subsidy on some imports that 
were levied and administered by Bank Idonesia. The Bank was 
considered to be a more reliable agency to enforce these supplementary 
effects than was the customs agency. Of course, ultimate enforcement
21. C. G. F. Simkin, "Indonesia’s Unrecorded Trade," Bulletin of
Indonesian Economic Studies, VI, No. 1 (March 19 70) , p. 3’2’. See 
also H. V. Richter, "Problems of Assessing Unrecorded Trade," 
Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, VI, No. 1 (March 1970).
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was still dependent on physical inspection of the exported or imported 
goods by customs, to make sure that the actual goods corresponded to 
those for which the foreign exchange had been bought. In one cele­
brated case in 1968, a group of traders bought foreign exchange at the 
BE rate and had allies ship empty boxes from Singapore. After suitable 
payoffs the traders were able to sell most of the exchange at the DP 
rate for a profit. Still, the Bank did add an extra check on the 
honesty of the system, and generally it worked. I believe that it is 
no accident that the dual exchange rate ended in 1970, only after 
there was a general feeling within the government that the reliability 
of the customs service had improved significantly.
A second point worth stressing is the role of access to credit as 
an important variable in the foreign exchange system. It takes a long 
time for imports to reach Indonesia. Long distances, irregular shipping 
schedules, and harbor delays can mean elapsed times from shipment to 
receipt by the importer of two weeks from Singapore, three weeks from 
Hong Kong, a month or two from Japan, and three or four months from 
the U.S. or Western Europe. Somebody has to finance the goods during 
this period. As part of its general import policy, the Indonesian 
government prohibited suppliers1 credits on "necessity" imports, 
forcing importers of these goods to pay for the goods at the time that 
they opened their letter of credit. Also, many importers of non­
necessity goods did not have sufficiently good trade connections abroad 
to obtain suppliers1 credits. With the long delays involved, access 
to Indonesian credit was important. Though interest rates were sub­
stantial in absolute terms and usually positive in real terms after 
October 1966, demand for credit generally exceeded the supply and 
informal rationing was necessary. Since much of the financing for 
trade credit was being provided by the state banks through Bank 
Indonesia discounting,22 the relative availability of trade credit and 
thus to some extent the demand for imports could be controlled by 
Bank Indonesia. This provided Bank Indonesia with a great deal of 
leverage, but it also means that access to credit had some of the 
characteristics with respect to imports of a licensing system. The 
"licenses/* though, were being allocated by the state banks. Between 
1965 and late 1968 these banks had been consolidated in one single 
institution; after 1968 they were hived off and given a semi-autonomous 
status.
But the "licensing" system was not really a closed one. There 
were smaller private banks, which lent funds at 1-2 per cent per month 
above the rates of the state banks, and there was always Singapore.
And, as inflation slowed and inventories of imported goods were again 
built up, demand for trade credit slackened so that rationing was no 
longer necessary. By 1970 , some branch managers of state banks wer-e 
complaining that they could not find enough demanders for their 
credit. Only for the very low interest loans--e.g., the 1 per cent 
a month medium term investment credits, which could be used to import 
capital equipment and were available after mid-1969--was there still 
significant excess demand. In sum, one could say that the foreign 
exchange system was not quite as open as it looked, but it was still 
a good deal more open than most other less developed countries1 foreign 
sector.
22. For a full discussion of the banking system, see David Cole, "New 
Directions for the Banking System," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic 
Studies, V, No. 2 (July 1969); John G. Gurley, "Notes on the Indo- 
nesian Financial System/* paper presented at the Dubrovnik Con­
ferences of the Harvard Development Advisory Service, June 1970 
mimeograph; and Arndt, "Banking."
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There is one other interesting aspect to the ban on suppliers 
credit and the forced use of domestic credit to finance imports. The 
high domestic interest rates put a premium on fast delivery of goods. 
It thus worked as a discriminatory tariff, favoring close suppliers. 
(Or, one could view it as a multiplicative factor on freight rates.) 
It also favored the use of Singapore as an entrepot for Indonesia, 
beyond that which the traditional ties of family and finance between 
the two countries would have warranted. An Indonesian importer who 
faced 3 per cent a month interest charges would have been willing to 
pay a Singapore trader up to 10-1/2 per cent more for an American 
produced item that could be delivered from Singapore in two weeks 
but would take four months from the U.S. This kind of margin could 
cover the Singapore trader’s warehousing and trans-shipping costs 
and still leave a margin of profit, since he faced an appreciably 
lower interest rate. But the higher price paid to the Singapore 
trader meant a foreign exchange loss for Indonesia. If the opportun­
ity cost to Indonesia of borrowing foreign exchange was less than 
3 per cent per month, the country would have been better off if the 
domestic interest rate on loans for imports had been decreased to 
that opportunity cost rate.
Export Incentives and Export Response
The import duty structure described in the third section appears to 
provide positive and substantial effective rates of protection for 
import substitution activities. By contrast, exports have been 
operating with negative effective protection. Exports have been 
subject to explicit export taxes. They have also been implicitly 
taxed through the operation of dual exchange rates before 1970 and 
through the over-valuation of the exchange rate caused by import 
duties. Further, except for investments undertaken through the 
Foreign and Domestic Investment Programs, exporters have had to pay 
duties on their imported inputs.
Nevertheless, the relative position of exporters has improved 
over time. The incentives for exporting compared to other activities 
in the economy are a compound of three factors: the relative taxa­
tion of exporters; the height of the exchange rate; and the general 
level of domestic prices.2  ^ As is seen in columns (l)-(3) of Table 8, 
the implicit and explicit taxes on exporters have been reduced con­
siderably. The average effective exchange rate for exporters23 4 has 
improved from 40 per cent to 90 per cent of the free market exchange 
rate between early 1966 and the middle of 1971. To the extent that 
new investors in export activities can get their imported inputs 
duty free and can get the 1 per cent per month medium term invest­
ment credits, effective returns have improved by even more than is 
indicated by Table 8.
23. This assumes a constant level of world selling prices for the 
commodity. If the world price of a particular commodity falls, 
exports of that commodity will be discouraged. If all export 
prices fall, one would expect a devaluation to compensate for it.
24. I.e., the actual rupiahs per dollar received by exporters, after 
allowing for export taxes and multiple exchange rates.
Table 8
Exporter Exchange Rates: (I) As a Percentage of Free Market
(II) Corrected for Inflation
Exporter exchange rates, 
as a percentage of free 
market rates Free
(DP)
market
exchange
rate
Cost of 
Living Index 
(Sept.1966=100)
Exporter exchange rates, 
corrected for inflation
"A" list "B" list 
exports3 exports3
All
exports^3
"A" list "B" list 
exports3 exports3
A H
exports3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1966 - Feb. 37% 52% 40% Rp 46.5/$ 36 47.8 68.5 53.6
- May 33 70 40 97.5 51 64.1 135.1 79.1
Nov. 56 78 60 95 129 41.8 57.8 44.6
1967 - I 56 76 60 116 166 39.1 53.3 41.8
- II 59 81 63 136 183 44.0 60.0 47.1
- III 69 88 74 158 205 54.5 69.9 58.1
IV 70 91 76 187 269 48.4 63.4 52.9
1968 - I 72 92 77 289 424 49.1 62.5 52.8
II 68 88 74 338 439 52.2 67.8 56.8
- III 64 86 70 388 487 51.3 68.7 55.7
- IV 69 84 73 437 502 59.7 72.7 63.7
1969 - I 76 86 78 396 544 55.3 62.7 56.9
- II 78 88 80 380 537 55.3 62.4 56.7
- III 78 88 80 378 541 54.6 61.6 56.0
IV 79 88 81 378 566 52.9 58.9 54.2
1970 - I 79 88 81 378 616 48.6 54.1 49.8
II 90 90 90 378 607 56.1 56.1 56.1
III 90 90 90 378 608 56.0 56.0 56.0
- IV 90 90 90 378 616 55.3 55.3 55.3
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Table 8 (cont)
Exporter Exchange Rates: (I) As a Percentage of Free Market
(II) Corrected for Inflation
Exporter exchange rates, 
as a percentage of free 
market rates
Exporter exchange rates, 
corrected for inflation
"A" list 
exports3
"B" list 
exports3 A U  h exports0
rice in a. i j s . c  l
(DP) exchange 
rate
LU5 L UJL
Living Index 
(Sept.1966=100)
"A" list 
exports3
"B" list 
exports3 A U  h exports0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1971 - I 90 90 90 378 656 51.9 51.9 51.9
- II 90 90 90 378 639 53.3 53.3 53.3
- Ill 90 90 90 415 621 60.2 60.2 60.2
(end)
a. The "A" list was composed of rubber, copra, coffee, tobacco, palm oil, palm kernels, pepper, and 
tin. Before July 1967, tea, sisal, and sugar were also in this group. The "B" list was composed 
of virtually all other exports, except petroleum, which was subject to its own regime. A very 
small quantity of handicrafts and manufacturers had higher effective exchange rates before July 
1967 and have been exempted from the 10 per cent export tax since April 1970.
b. Excluding petroleum.
Source: Bruce Glassburner, "Pricing of Foreign Exchange in Indonesia, 1966-67," Economic Development
and Cultural Change, XVIII, No. 2 (January 1970); and Bank Indonesia figures.
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To get the real returns to exporting, though, we must multiply 
the figures in columns (l)-(3) by the free market exchange rate to 
get the rupiahs received per dollar of export, and then correct these 
for the price level. The results of these calculations are shown in 
columns (6)-(8). The amount of real improvement, in the rupiah re­
ceipts depends on which period is used as the base. Between February 
1966 and the third quarter of 1971, the real rupiah receipts of all 
exporters improved by only 12 per cent. The reason, of course, is 
that the cost of living index increased by 17.2 times during this 
period, while the free market exchange rate increased by only 8.9 
times. A major reason for the exchange rate not increasing by as much 
as the cost of living index was the large inflow of foreign aid after 
1966. This allowed an increased demand for imports to be satisfied 
without the need for devaluing the exchange rate by as much as would 
otherwise have been the case. Most of the relative adjustment between 
the cost of living index and the exchange rate, however, had taken 
place by the first quarter of 1967. Between 1967-1 and 1971-III, the 
cost of living index rose 3.7 times and the exchange rate rose 3.6 
times. Accordingly, the 50 per cent improvement in the relative taxa­
tion of exports between these dates was mirrored by a just under 50 per 
cent improvement in the real rupiah receipts of exporters.
The returns to exporters have not been uniform, however. Before 
April 1970, the opportunities for discrimination among exports were 
large. Explicit export taxes were 10 per cent on some commodities and 
25 per cent (later 15 per cent) on others. Further, the dual exchange 
rate, check-prices,25 and the levying of the export tax on the check- 
price rather than the actual export price offered room for greater 
discrimination. In theory the check-price could range between 0 per 
cent and 100 per cent of the FOB export price. The former meant that 
the exporter paid no export tax and converted all of his foreign ex­
change at the higher DP exchange rate; the latter meant a 10, 15, or 
25 per cent tax on the full FOB value, with the remainder of the ex­
porter's foreign exchange converted at the less favorable BE rate.
With the 25 per cent export tax and a 16 per cent exchange rate margin 
between the BE and the DP exchange rates, the potential differential 
returns were substantial.
The differential returns to exports in the A and B categories are 
indicated in Table 8. These differential returns had two justifications. 
The A list exports were the traditional exports which had well-estab­
lished markets. The B list items were considered newer and more in 
need of explicit or implicit incentives to help them break into new 
markets. Also, the lower check-prices for B list exports were as much 
a matter of necessity as desire by the Ministry of Trade. World 
export prices were less readily available for most B list items than 
for A list items. The Ministry's information gathering facilities were 
not sufficiently developed to allow it to set check-prices for B list 
exports. Consequently, the check prices were set by exporter associa­
tions. After mid-1967, these associations tended to set their check
25. Check->prices were the nominal prices at which exporters were re­
quired to sell their foreign exchange receipts to the government 
(at the unfavorable BE exchange rate). Since these check-prices 
were frequently set below the true FOB export price, the exporter 
could keep the difference between the FOB price and the check- 
price and sell it for rupiahs at the more favorable DP exchange 
rate.
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prices at roughly 50 per cent of FOB value. This seems to have been 
a rough compromise between the associations’ desires to have a zero 
check-price and the Ministry’s desire to have high check-prices for 
export tax revenue purposes.
Within the A list there were differences in exporter returns 
among commodities and over time. The government’s goals included 
obtaining revenue from export taxes and ensuring adequate exporter 
returns so as to discourage smuggling. Also, short-run supply 
elasticities were assumed to be quite low, so that the ”non-func- 
tional” returns from temporary high prices could be taxed away with­
out serious consequences. Depending on the time and the crop, one 
of these goals would dominate. Unexpected changes in actual export 
prices after the check-prices for the month had been announced were 
an additional element in the determination of actual exporter returns. 
Table 9 shows the quarterly returns to exporters on A list exports 
in 1968 and 1969. Rubber and copra were consistently favored over 
the other commodities. There were widespread fears that substantial 
amounts of copra and rubber were being or would be smuggled if suffi­
cient returns were not forthcoming. Also, the Ministry was concerned 
about the deterioration of the stock of rubber and coconut trees and 
wanted to offer some encouragement for better upkeep and replanting.
By contrast, coffee was in surplus in Indonesia, and, as a member of 
the International Coffee Agreement, Indonesia was limited as to coffee 
exports. There was no need to encourage more coffee production. Palm 
oil, palm kernels, and pepper all had favorable prices and good mar­
kets. They did not seem to need extra incentives.
Table 9
Effective Exchange Rates, Major Export Commodities, 
1968-1969 (Rupiahs per dollar)
1968 1969
I II III IV I II III IV
Rubber 206 234 271 325 314 314 317 301
Copra 213 236 255 307 308 304 311 316
Coffee 206 224 242 283 278 277 285 293
Palm Oil 212 228 242 285 283 281 289 289
Palm Kernels 210 226 242 277 291 282 280 282
Pepper 211 240 244 284 277 279 297 280
Source: C. G. F. Simkin, ’’Indonesia’s Unrecorded Trade,” Bulletin of
Indonesian Economic Studies, IV, No. 1 (March 1970); and 
Ministry of Trade figures.
Since the April 1970 consolidation of the exchange rate, there 
has not been very much discrimination among exports as to effective 
returns. Oil exports have their own regime, and the tiny category 
of manufactured exports are exempt from the 10 per cent export tax, 
but the remainder are all subject to the 10 per cent export tax. The 
tax is applied to ’’guideline” prices set by the Ministry of Trade,
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but in most cases these guideline prices have been set very close to 
actual export prices. Only in a few instances has the Ministry 
deliberately manipulated these prices: In 1970, the guideline prices
of timber were set low, so as to give an extra incentive to timber 
extraction. And guideline prices that are slightly above actual prices 
have been set for very low grades of rubber, so as to discourage low 
grade rubber exports. But the effects have not been very great. Also, 
new investors can qualify for exemptions on imports and may qualify 
for the 1 per cent medium term credits. But these are open to investors 
in virtually all export areas, so discrimination among exports does 
not enter here.
Just as for import tariffs, though, the nominal export tax does 
not tell the whole story. We should be looking at the value added in 
export activities and analyzing by how much value added is depressed 
by the export tax. If different export activities had substantially 
different percentages of domestic value added, the uniform 10 per cent 
export tax could be yielding large differences in effective taxation 
and could have strong allocative effects. This would be particularly 
important for manufactured exports. But this is less important for 
Indonesia's current exports, which are entirely minerals and agricul­
tural raw materials. Domestic value added bulks very large in all of 
these activities, so the 10 per cent export tax is very close to a 
uniform 10 per cent tax on value added. Even in cases in which pro­
cessing of exports is possible--e .g. , crumb rubber, coconut oil from 
copra, refining of mineral ores--the primary input is the basic raw 
material which also carries a 10 per cent export tax. Accordingly, 
the effective tax on the value added in the processing is still 10 
per cent.
The response of exports to the improvement in returns over time 
and to the differential returns to different commodities is difficult 
to measure. The dollar value of total exports has grown from $714 
million in 1966 to $1,173 in 1970. The sub-total for exports other 
than petroleum has grown from $499 million to $739 million over the 
same period. But it is difficult to determine how much of this 
latter growth is true growth and how much is simply a return of ex­
ports to official channels from smuggling. When we look at individual 
commodities, the same question of real growth as against smuggling 
diversion arises. Some apparent growth in volumes may simply be better 
reporting by the statistical agencies. Further, the full supply 
response for tree and bush crops like rubber, coconuts (copra), palm 
oil and kernels, coffee, and pepper surely takes longer than the five 
years under study. Some short run response to improved returns is 
possible from more intensive picking and tapping and from inventory 
changes,26 but the full response from new plantings takes longer. Years 
of neglect under Sukarno cannot be undone quickly. Finally, exporters 
respond not only to rupiah receipts per dollar but also to international 
selling prices. Very favorable international prices can offset poor 
rupiah returns (this is usually the justification offered for heavy 
taxation of exports) and conversely.
The recorded volumes of Indonesia's major exports (excluding 
petroleum) over the past decade are offered in Table 10. Rubber and 
copra exports do seem to have improved during the past three years 
compared to the previous eight. This may be true growth; it may be 
a diversion from smuggling; it is probably an analgam of the two. But
26. Though, at the rates of interest prevalent in the Indonesian 
economy, large inventories are not likely.
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even if it only represents a diversion from smuggling, the recorded 
increase does indicate that exporters are at least sensitive enough 
to official rupiah returns to change their channels of export. The 
trends in the other commodities are less observable. The year 1970 
does seem to have been a good year for palm oil, palm kernels, tin, 
and tobacco, but it is too early to tell if these performances are 
going to be typical. Coffee exports are limited by the International 
Coffee Agreement. And pepper exports in 1970 were hampered by a 
serious pepper vine disease.
Table 10
Exports of Major Commodities, 1960-1970 
(Volume in thousands of metric tons)
I960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
Rubber 556 657 777 581 627 708 680 652 771 755 825
Copra 168 247 110 108 150 124 119 114 217 157 188
Coffee 41 66 57 71 59 108 98 133 85 104 108
Palm Oil 106 117 100 110 133 126 177 133 152 120 173
Palm
kernels n.a. 33 31 31 33 33 32 39 37 28 44
Pepper 12 18 11 28 22 12 21 37 25 13 2
Tin 35 24 28 21 0.5 19 12 21 32 27 35
Tobacco 3 3 11 10 2 14 13 10 9 6 17
Source: Biro Pusat Statistik, Statistical Pocketbook of Indonesia,
1964-1967, pp. 227-245; Biro Pusat Statistik, Monthly 
Statistical Bulletin, May 1971, p. 101; Bank Indonesia, 
Indonesian Financial Statistics, October 1971, p. 132.
Perhaps the best indicator of the response to improved returns 
to exports has been the growth of timber exports. In 1966, annual 
timber exports were under $10 million. In 1970, they were roughtly 
$125 million, and in the first quarter of 1971 they were over $40 
million. It is difficult to believe that increases of this magnitude 
could have occurred in the absence of the general freeing up of the 
foreign exchange system that has simultaneously occurred.
Despite the continuing explicit and implicit taxation of ex­
ports, the actual and potential comparative advantage of Indonesia 
in mineral, timber, and some agricultural exports has been so great 
that substantial amounts of new investments have been made or are 
intended for these areas. Another way of expressing this is that 
the opportunity costs in the absence of exports on the natural re­
sources in these areas are so low that even in the face of tax dis­
incentives these activities are quite profitable and have warranted 
substantial new investment. Of the $1,605 million in foreign invest­
ment (excluding oil related investment) approved by the Foreign In­
vestment Board through September 1971, $1,032 million was intended for 
agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, and quarrying.
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Still, the negative protection given to exports has had its 
allocative effects. It has effectively ruled out substantial exports 
of Indonesian manufactures. The incentives are simply not there.
Only one firm has successfully navigated the oceans of bureaucratic 
red tape and has established a duty free zone for itself, importing 
transistor components from Hong Kong, assembling them, and exporting 
the finished transistors back to Hong Kong. A handful of batiks and 
handicrafts are the only other manufactured products that leave Indo­
nesia. The government has established a bonded warehouse, which it 
eventually hopes to expand into a duty-free manufacturing zone, but 
progress has been slow. The negative protection has also surely 
discouraged investments at the margin in export activities, though 
this has been partially mitigated by the foreign and domestic invest­
ment programs, which allow import duty exemptions (but not an export 
tax exemption) for exporting activities as well as import substitu­
tion activities.
Pricing and Moving Tied Foreign Aid
Tied foreign aid has presented a unique problem for Indonesian 
open exchange rate system. Tied aid is worth less to the user than 
an equal amount of cash foreign currency, since the tied aid usually 
has to be used to buy goods that are overpriced in world markets.
For most LDC exchange rate regimes this does not present a problem. 
Since their exchange rates are over-valued and subject to licensing, 
the licenses have a scarcity value that is higher than the nominal 
value of the foreign exchange. As long as the scarcity premium of 
the license is greater than the excess cost of the goods that are 
tied to the aid, aid foreign exchange can be sold without any extra 
effort. Importers would prefer to get a license for imports that are 
untied, but they can still make a profit from the license for tied 
imports.
But if foreign exchange does not have a scarcity premium above 
its face value, tied foreign aid cannot be sold alongside cash foreign 
exchange. Some means of pricing it lower than cash foreign exchange 
must be found. Further, the tied aid from different countries will 
have different equilibrium prices depending on the degree of excess 
cost over world prices that is involved in the tied goods.27 A single 
exchange rate for all tied foreign aid will either fail to move some 
of the more over-priced aid goods or will offer a windfall gain to 
the buyers of the less over-priced aid goods and thus yield less 
counterpart revenues for the government.
The obvious solution is to auction the aid from each donor sepa­
rately and let the market determine the price for each aid tranche. 
Unfortunately, the donors of the more over-priced aid are reluctant 
to see their aid sold at a rate that is Mtoo cheap,” and the IMF has 
frowned on anything that smacked of multiple exchange rates.
Faced with this dilemma, Indonesia has tried a number of policies. 
From early 1967 through mid-1968, all aid was priced uniformly at a 
rate that was 10-20 per cent below the primary (BE) exchange rate, 
with occasional help from favorable credit terms. Japanese aid funds 
moved very rapidly; American aid funds moved more slowly. In July
27. See Glassburner, "Pricing,” pp. 180-183.
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1968 the aid exchange rate was unified with the BE rate, and special 
credit terms were employed to give aid funds an advantage. Differ­
ential credit terms among countries allowed some adjustment for the 
different sources of aid. It is not clear why this arrangement was 
considered unsatisfactory, but when the exchange rate was consolidated 
in April 1970, Indonesia reverted to the former practice of a single 
explicit price for aid that was 14 per cent below the cash foreign 
exchange rate. Again, Japanese aid moved very fast. In December, 
the aid rate was consolidated with the official exchange rate, and 
differential credit terms were again used. Finally, after the de­
valuation of August 1971, Indonesia won from the donors the agreement 
that explicit differential rupiah subsidies could be given to the 
buyers of different countries aid funds. Thus all buyers of aid 
funds will have to pay the official rate, Rp 415 = $1 for their 
funds, but the buyers of the more over-priced aid will get back a 
larger rupiah "refund" than will the buyers of the less over-priced 
aid funds. With a little practice, the Indonesian authorities ought 
to be able to duplicate roughly the results of an auction system.
Foreign Investment
Foreign investment poses a difficult political and economic prob­
lem for Indonesia. The welcoming of foreign investment has been one 
of the hallmarks of the economic policies of the new regime. The 
government has already approved over $1.6 billion in foreign invest­
ment in four years. This sum, if effected, will leave a significant 
mark on the Indonesian economy. In addition, foreign oil companies 
have spent an estimated $350-400 million on oil exploration and 
field development.
Foreign investment brings capital and skills to the Indonesian 
economy. But it also brings foreign claims on the economy. It gives 
foreigners a significant "say" in the Indonesian economy. Foreigners 
may out-compete and drive to the wall Indonesian entrepreneurs; con­
sumers may benefit but entrepreneurs suffer. Foreign investment can 
mean a net foreign exchange loss if the foreigners' activities are 
given excessive protection. Mineral extraction and forestry by 
foreigners may pose special political problems for the future. Future 
generations of Indonesians may forget or discount the taxes paid and 
employment created by the foreigners and simply ask, who has "plunder­
ed" Indonesia's natural resources and why?
In its eagerness to establish a good name with foreign investors 
and partly from a lack of technical expertise in dealing with foreign 
investors, the Indonesian Government was probably too lenient in its 
tax concessions in the early contracts, particularly in the mining and 
forestry areas. Replanting provisions in forestry contracts have been 
absent or weakly enforced. More recent contracts have been notice­
ably tougher. But still, one can question the value of tax holidays 
and tariff duty exemptions. Most of the home countries of the foreign 
investors have double taxation provisions, whereby income taxes paid 
in Indonesia are an offset against taxes in the home country. Thus, 
an income tax holiday for the foreign investor mostly benefits the 
home country treasury, not the foreign investor. Why, then, are the 
foreign investors eager to obtain a tax holiday? In some cases, the 
tax holiday does mean a net gain for the foreign investor. But, 
primarily, the tax holiday appears to be interpreted as an indication 
of good faith on the part of the host government. The government ought
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to be able to devise a less costly token of good faith. The tariff 
duty exemptions lose revenue and have the expected allocative effect: 
they encourage capital-intensive production processes using imported 
capital equipment.
The tax concessions to foreigners have had further costs, since 
the provisions are applicable to approved domestic investors. The 
Foreign Investment Law, enacted in early 1967, raised the demand that 
equal treatment be given to domestic investors. Accordingly, in 
November 1968 the Domestic Investment Law came into force, with 
comparable provisions.
In some areas, the government has had second thoughts about 
foreign investment. Beginning in mid-1968, the Ministry of Industries 
began closing some manufacturing areas to foreign investors. By 
December 1970 this list had reached forty-one industries. These in­
dustries are listed in Table 11. In practice, a few exceptions have 
been made, and if a foreign investor is persistent enough he may be 
able to win his case, particularly if he is willing to invest outside 
of Java. Nevertheless, the clear intent of the action is to protect 
the existing producers in these industries from future competition 
by new foreign entrants. To the extent that domestic entrepreneurs 
by themselves are not prepared to enter some of these industries, 
either because of capital or technological barriers, these industries 
are effectively protected from further competition.
Some features of Table 11 are worth noting. First, canned milk, 
dry cell batteries, galvanized sheets, and mosquito incense are also 
on the list of banned imports. With imports banned and foreign entry 
foreclosed, the present producers face actual and potential competi­
tion only from domestic entrants and smuggled imports. Further, in 
the areas of cigarettes, dairy products, detergents, shoe polish, and 
beverages, the primary beneficiaries of this barrier to new entry 
are earlier foreign investors. Foreign investors will also benefit 
from the entry barriers on dry cell batteries, sewing machine assembly, 
leather shoes, porcelain tiles, and bicycle tires and tubes. In these 
areas, the foreign investment barriers may yield the worst of all 
possible worlds: highly protected markets, large profits for foreigners,
and thus large claims by foreigners on the Indonesian economy. Future 
entry, or at least the potential for entry, would clearly be in the 
interests of everyone (except the current producers). Also, the areas 
of wigs, leather tanning, and watch assembly are actual and potential 
export industries. There seems to be little gain to Indonesia to 
preventing foreign entry into these areas.
This entry foreclosure brings out the essential sensitivity prob­
lem of foreign investment. Domestic entrepreneurs and even earlier 
foreign entrepreneurs are unhappy about facing new competition. This 
has not yet become a problem in mining and mineral exploration, be­
cause Indonesians clearly do not yet have the large capital sums and 
technological skills that are necessary (though Indonesia has developed 
a domestic capability in petroleum). Over 30 per cent of foreign 
investment has been intended for mining activities; only 1 per cent 
of domestic investment has been similarly intended. As Indonesian 
capabilities in mining are developed in the future, the sensitivity 
to foreign investment in mining will surely increase.
There is no easy way out of this dilemma. Outright foreclosure 
of new foreign entry may generate greater costs than benefits. Rather,
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Table 11
Industries closed to Foreign Investment, 
as of December 1970
Milk and other dairy products 
Dry cell batteries 
Monosodium glutamate 
Cigarettes 
Matches
Paint, varnish, lacquer
Plastic and leather shoes
Agricultural tools
Nails, screws, nuts, bolts
Laundry soaps
Detergent
Coconut oil
Nail-wire drawing
Flour mills
Tooth paste
Biscuits, bread, confectionery
Bicycle tires and tubes
Boot polish
Plastic ware
Printing
Bicycle assembly 
Printing ink 
Enamelware
Aluminum house-hold ware 
Candy
Soft-drinks
Concrete and porcelain tiles
Bricks and tiles
Sewing machine assembly
Ice making
Can making
Tooth brushes
Mosquito incense
Watch assembly
Corrugated cardboard
Instant noodles
Zip fastener
Tanning
Hair wigs
Galvanized iron sheet
Fabric manufacturing except integrated spinning and weaving
Source: Ministry of Industries; and Wilhelm Boucherie, "Some 
Preliminary Estimates Concerning the Present Struc­
ture of Industry" (Djakarta: Harvard Development 
Advisory Service, 1971), mimeograph.
excessively protected market positions should not be given to foreign 
investors, or to domestic investors either, and the tax concessions 
to foreigners should be withdrawn or shortened. This is especially 
true for mineral and forestry concessions. If foreign investors still 
find it profitable to enter areas in which domestic entrepreneurs have 
an "infant industry" argument for survival, the presently available
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low interest rate medium-term investment credit program is the suit­
able instrument for assistance.
A Strategy for the Future
With the stabilization program now a success, the attention of 
Indonesian policy-makers will be turning increasingly toward devising 
a long-run development policy. The second five year plan (1974-1979) 
will be based on that policy. While agriculture will remain the 
most important sector, more attention must and will be given to an 
industrialization strategy. The foreign trade sector will surely 
enter crucially into that strategy.
Indonesia must develop a coherent and enforceable tariff struc­
ture. That structure must be aimed at promoting labor-intensive manu­
factures for both domestic consumption and export. The pitfalls of 
an industrialization strategy based solely on import substitution, 
a la Pakistan, India, and Latin America, are now readily apparent: 
inefficient industries develop which refuse to disappear or become 
efficient; the small economic size of markets precludes efficient 
production in some areas; import licensing spawns a bureaucratic 
morass; efforts at exporting manufactures require extra subsidies 
which may turn out to be uneconomic; industrial expansion into inter­
mediate and capital goods becomes difficult as the producers of final 
goods become used to access to foreign supplies at favorable implicit 
exchange rates; the industrial structure becomes excessively capital 
intensive; income distribution takes an unwelcome swing toward the 
new industrialists.28
An industrialization strategy more keyed to exports should avoid 
most of these pitfalls. Also, Indonesia is relatively well located 
to take advantage of future efforts by Japan to farm out its labor- 
intensive manufactures. As wage rates rise in Korea, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, and Singapore, the Indonesian economy could be in a good posi­
tion to become a manufacturing supplier for Japan.
This kind of strategy would argue for a tariff structure with a 
few broad categories of relatively low rates. Excessive effective 
protection would not be given to domestic producers. Duties on 
capital goods would be positive rather than zero, so as to give actual 
or potential domestic capital goods producers some modest effective 
protection and to discourage capital-intensive manufacturing generally. 
The low tariff structure would mean that the exchange rate would 
continue to bear the brunt of adjusting Indonesia's foreign trade 
sector to changes in the external and internal environment. Exports 
would thus not be subject to very much implicit taxation from an 
overvalued exchange rate. As the general taxation efforts by the 
Government improve, the Government will have less need to rely on 
trade taxes. It is even quite possible that this tariff structure
28. For a complete discussion of these issues, see I.M.D. Little, 
Scitovsky, Tibor, and Maurice Scott, Industry and Trade In Some 
Developing Countries (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970).
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would increase revenues, since the low rates would encourage the re­
turn of smuggling flows to legal channels and the imposition of duties 
on capital goods, other exempt items, and on new investors "would 
generate increased revenues. A general excise tax at a high rate 
(perhaps 100 per cent) would be retained for luxuries.
This kind of strategy would continue to encourage Indonesia's 
traditional raw material exports, while stimulating new manufactured 
exports. But even with moderate duties on imputs, manufacturers aim­
ing at export markets would still be at a disadvantage if they had 
to use imported or protected inputs. Establishing a duty-free zone 
or giving rebates on the tariffs paid on imported inputs is one solu­
tion. As a short-run measure, this will probably be the fastest and 
easiest way of entering the labor intensive areas of assembling 
manufactured components for export markets. But as a long-run solu­
tion it is not entirely satisfactory. It leads to a preference for 
imported inputs over domestically produced inputs, since the latter 
are presumably priced so as to take advantage of the tariff protec­
tion and also may be using imported inputs on which no rebate is 
available. The only satisfactory scheme would be one in which the 
exporter received the tariff rebate on his inputs, regardless of 
their source.
Maintaining an outward-directed industrialization strategy will 
not be easy. There will always be a strong temptation to aim exclu­
sively for the secure, protectable domestic market. The voices of 
protectionism are likely to grow stronger, not weaker, as Indonesia's 
manufacturing sector expands in the short-run. The current banned 
import list could be a taste of what might happen in the future. But 
the long-run costs of an inward-looking, protectionist strategy are 
clearly very high. I believe that Indonesia can and should avoid 
them.
